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Comment: What's on Second?
GEORGE MUNDSTOCK*
I. IMPACT ON FOREIGN TAX SYsmsS .....................................
II. TRANSrrION RuIL S ....................................................
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The paper by Stephen E. Shay and Victoria P. Summers1 presents a
thorough and rich analysis of the numerous economic and practical
international issues that would arise if the United States were to replace
the current income tax with a destination- or origin-based consumption
tax, such as the disguised value-added taxes ("VATs") of the ArmeyShelby "flat tax" (the "Flat Tax") 2 and the Nunn-Domenici "Unlimited
Savings Account" tax (the "USA Tax"). 3 Two of the paper's points are
particularly interesting. First, such a major shift in tax policy by such an
important participant in the international economy would have dramatic
effects on foreign tax systems. Second, international transactions raise
special concerns as to how transition to a changed tax system would, by
itself, affect economic efficiency and the wealth of U.S. persons. These
two points will be addressed in order. In both cases, importing some
knowledge from outside the consumption tax literature-what's on second-provides helpful perspective.
I.

IMPACT ON FOREIGN TAX SYSTEMS

Shay's and Summers' most striking point is that tax reform, as proposed, would impact foreign tax systems in ways that could unwind the
current U.S. income tax treaty network. Given how important income
tax treaties are to the international flow of capital, and given Shay's
considerable experience in negotiating such treaties on behalf of the
United States, this concern is troubling indeed. Nevertheless, the disruption that Shay and Summers find so troubling as a practical and transitional problem might in fact be desirable as a long-term economic
matter.
The current U.S. income tax treaty network is an artifact of the first
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law.
1. Stephen E. Shay & Victoria Summers, Selected InternationalAspectsof FundamentalTax
Reform Proposals,51 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1029 (1997).
2. Freedom and Fairness Restoration Act of 1995, H.R. 2060, 104th Cong. (1995); S. 1050,
104th Cong. (1995).

3. USA Tax Act of 1995, S. 722, 104th Cong. (1995).

1079

1080

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:1079

half of the twentieth century.' During this period, the United States was
pre-eminent in world markets, was overwhelmingly a capital exporter,
and had one of the highest rates of corporate tax. The United States
used this position paternally. Its approach, including hanging tough on
tax sparring, helped its treaty partners, particularly those less well off, to
establish and maintain meaningful income taxes following the U.S.
domestic model (including an unintegrated corporate tax). With hindsight, it is not clear that this approach was beneficial. It seems much
less appropriate now. The United States currently plays a smaller role in
international capital flows, imports considerable capital, and has a relatively lower corporate rate (which, as a practical matter, would be even
lower, or zero, under the proposed tax reforms).
Shay and Summers focus on how the proposals would require foreign countries to deal with U.S transactions or U.S. multinationals themselves rather than, as currently, the U.S. tax system policing abuse of
foreign taxes for the foreign countries. For example, Shay and Summers
are concerned that the United States might become an income tax
haven. They also are concerned that U.S. investors might increase the
leverage of their foreign holdings. These problems arise from two separate features of the proposals: going to a territorial system and shifting
to a consumption tax.
Foreign tax systems fend for themselves today with regard to international transactions not involving the United States.7 It is not obvious
why the United States should stand alone. Optimal tariff theory and its
progeny teach that, in international tax matters, a country can increase
domestic welfare through self interest.' The United States has accommodated foreign countries gaming the U.S. Treasury with territorial sys4. The following discussion draws heavily on Stanford G. Ross, A Perspective on
InternationalTax Policy, TAx NotEs 701 (Feb. 18, 1985); Charles I. Kingson, The Coherence of
InternationalTaxation, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1151 (1981).
5. The higher the U.S. rate, the more power the United States has to help foreign states by
softening the impact of foreign taxes on international business location decisions through allowing
credit for foreign taxes. To look at it another way, a company in an excess credit position for the
foreseeable future would worry more about foreign taxes than one that could fully credit all
foreign taxes. (Foreign tax credit baskets, of course, complicate this analysis.)
6. In any event, it is a little late to be concerned about the United States becoming a tax
haven. Unilateral repeal of the U.S. "withholding" tax on portfolio interest in 1984 intentionally
turned the United States into a galaxy-class tax haven. See I.R.C. §§ 871(h), 1441(c)(8) (1996);
Charles E. McLure, Jr., U.S. Tax Laws and Capital Flight from Latin America, 20 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REv. 321 (1989).
7. For example, the United Kingdom does a nice job of dealing with France's territorial
system in the relevant treaty. See, e.g., Income Tax Treaty, May 22, 1968, France-U.K., art.
11(6).
8. See Joel Slemrod, Competitive Advantage and the Optimal Tax Treatment of the ForeignSource Income of Multinationals: The Case of the United States and Japan, 9 AM. J. TAX POL.
113 (1991).
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tems (the often-noted irony of the DISC GAT controversy) and partial
integration. A new U.S. international tax policy could be based on a fair
and reasonable self interest, not tax isolationism.
11.

TRANSIoN RuLEs

Transition problems are central to the debate over shifting to a consumption tax. Most importantly-and quite surprisingly-most of the
gains in overall economic welfare claimed by consumption tax proponents would result, not from having an ongoing consumption tax (rather
than an income tax) in the future, but from raising revenue as a consequence of the practical one-time tax on wealth (income) accumulated
prior to the transition, which tax is inherent in a shift to a consumption
tax.' This practical one-time wealth tax would arise as this old wealth,
which could be enjoyed tax-free today, bears consumption tax as it is
enjoyed. (Future income would bear a consumption tax, but no income
tax, and thus, would not be subject to this practical wealth tax.10) A onetime wealth tax would permit lower tax rates for those taxes that reduce
economic efficiency as a consequence of their ongoing incidence interfering with behavior. This transition concern was the number one public
reason (among many) that the U.S. Treasury rejected a shift to a consumption tax in 1984.11
The most important international transition problem identified by
Shay and Summers relates to how businesses would treat depreciable
assets acquired before the consumption tax takes effect. Immediate
expensing of all unrecovered basis of all such assets on the effective date
would approximate proper consumption tax treatment, but also would
break the bank. For this reason, the USA Tax and the Flat Tax would
continue depreciation for pre-effective-date depreciable property. This
would have the effect of adding an income tax on these assets to the
consumption tax regime. 2 This extra tax confuses the economic analy9. See David Bradford, Consumption Taxes: Some Fundamental Transition Issues, in

FRoNTmIRs OF TAx REF RM 123-50 (Michael J. Boskin ed., 1996).
10. The incidence of the wealth tax is unclear. If monetary policy allowed prices and wages
to rise by the amount of the disguised VAT, old wealth would buy less, and the tax would

probably be borne by owners of old wealth. For example, retirees' non-pension savings would
buy less. To the extent a different monetary policy changed this result, the incidence would shift.
For example, if old wealth were protected by prices being held constant, borrowers would be hurt
as they lost the benefit of interest deductions (with no offsetting benefit from VAT-driven
inflation pushing down the real burden of the debt).
11. See U.S. Treasury, Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth 212
(1984).
12. See generally David G. Raboy & Cliff Massa III, Problems of Transition to a ValueAdded Tax, in Tim VALUE ADDED TAx: ORTHODoxY AND NEW THINKING 103 (Murray L.
Weidenbaum, David G. Raboy & Ernest S. Christian, Jr. eds., 1989).
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sis considerably.'"
Not surprisingly, this complicates the international picture. It is
very unlikely that the transition income tax would function as a lumpsum tax, say on old depreciable assets. Without this effect, it would be
impossible for exchange rates to fully adjust for the entire new U.S. tax
system. As a result, for some time there would be a real difference
between origin and destination bases for the business tax. Also, under a
destination-based regime, like the business part of the USA Tax, 4 to
prevent a windfall for old depreciable assets used to produce exports
(rather than in domestic production), this extra income tax should apply
as the current tax does, including as to exports, even though exports
generally are exempt from consumption tax. 5 This would require difficult ad hoc rules to determine which export income relates to pre-effective-date assets.
The international transition problem that Shay and Summers apparently find most troubling is the treatment of the repatriation of income
earned in offshore subsidiaries that, as of the effective date of the consumption tax, has yet to bear a full tax (by U.S. standards). The consumption tax proposals would exempt all dividends from subsidiaries,
domestic or foreign. Shay and Summers view this as a windfall with
respect to pre-effective-date low-tax deferred foreign income. Perhaps
they are reminded of the 1984 exemption of deferred DISC income."
At first glance, an exemption for income that has not been subject
to a full tax is troubling. In fact, there is little reason to be specially
concerned here. 17 Income is a concept, not a person, real or juridical.
Concepts do not bear tax; persons bear tax.18 The proposals would give
owners of shares, not income, a tax break (compared to current law).
Under the Flat Tax, individuals would get the greatest break, while
shareholders that own over eighty percent of a U.S. corporation would
13. Thomas Barthold suggested this presentation of the old depreciable assets transition
problem to me. The extra tax prevents windfalls. New depreciable assets will be more costly
because of the VAT. Expensing reflects this. On the other hand, expensing old, "cheap,"
depreciable assets gives windfalls. To look at this from the other direction, old depreciable assets
were purchased "cheap," because only depreciation was expected, so that expensing effects
windfalls.
14. The USA Tax's business tax is not purely destination-based because of the limitation on
the expensing of export-related assets.
15. Since foreign income would be exempt, old foreign assets should not be recoverable,
although the proposals apparently provide that they are.
16. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, P.L. 98-369, § 805(b)(2).
17. The following analysis is based on George Mundstock, Section 902 Is Too Generous, 48
TAx L. REv. 281, 301-12 (1993).

18. Of course, only individuals really bear taxes, so that taxes on business entities are further
shifted. For present purposes, however, looking at taxes on persons simplifies the discussion with
no loss in accuracy.
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get the least (since they currently bear little or no tax). Things are a bit
different under the USA Tax. Under both proposals, however, the break
for U.S. corporate shareholders of foreign corporations on pre-effectivedate earnings would fall between domestic extremes, depending on the
amount of taxes attributable to the underlying earnings. There is no reason to be more troubled by the foreign break than by the comparable
domestic breaks. This is not like 1984, when selected foreign corporate
dividends got a special break. In fact, one might find a break for income
"trapped" offshore to be an attractive incentive to repatriate capital to the
United States. If one is bothered by any benefit with respect to taxhaven activity, one can take comfort in the fact that the proposals would
hurt tax-haven businesses by making them less valuable as a consequence of the prospective elimination of their relatively tax-favored
status.

